From
Dictatorship to Democracy: Truth Commissions and the Panamanian experience
investigating the crimes committed under the military dictatorship=
Alexis Michel=
le
Martínez Sciglianiy
*Autor para Correspondencia. E-mail: ammscigliani@gmail.com
Recibido:
7 de diciembre de 2020
Aceptado:
12 de enero de 2020
____________________________________________________
La justicia transicional es la
concepción de la justicia asociada a períodos de cambio político, caracteri=
zada
por respuestas jurídicas para hacer frente a los actos ilícitos de los
regímenes represivos predecesores. Las Comisiones de la Verdad han sido uno=
de
los instrumentos para lograr la justicia de transición. Como mencionó Adria=
na
Rudling, hay múltiples razones por las que los gobiernos establecen Comisio=
nes
de la Verdad. Por ejemplo, en Chile, Patricio Alywin decidió crear una Comi=
sión
de la Verdad porque era consciente de la necesidad de reconocer el sufrimie=
nto
de las víctimas. Por otro lado, en el Chad, Idriss Deby estableció la Comis=
ión
de la Verdad para limpiar su imagen en comparación con el último régimen
criminal. Los gobiernos pueden ver este instrumento como una transferencia =
de
responsabilidad a un tercero, por lo que están exentos de encontrar una
narrativa que convenga a todas las partes involucradas en el conflicto mien=
tras
manifiestan la intención, auténtica o no, de hacer justicia.
En este artículo se analiza la Comi=
sión
de la Verdad de Panamá, creada el 18 de enero de 2001, mediante el Decreto
Ejecutivo No. 2. Esta Comisión tenía el mandato de investigar las violacion=
es a
los derechos humanos cometidas durante la dictadura militar de los generales
Omar Torrijos Herrera y Manuel Antonio Noriega entre 1968 y 1989.
Transi=
tional
justice is the conception of justice associated with periods of political
change, which is characterized by effective legal responses to confront the=
wrongdoings
of repressive predecessor regimes.[1]
Truth Commissions are one of the instruments to achieve transitional justic=
e.
As Adriana Rudling[2] ment=
ioned,
there are multiple reasons why governments establish Truth Commissions. For
example, in Chile, Patricio Alywin decided to implement a Truth Commission
because he was aware of the necessity of recognizing the suffering of victi=
ms.
On the other hand, in Chad, Idriss Deby established the Truth Commission to
clean his image and distinguish his government from its predecessor’s crimi=
nal
regime. Governments can see this instrument as a mechanism for transferring
responsibility to a third party, so they are exempted from finding a narrat=
ive
that suits all parties involved in the conflict while manifesting their
intentions, authentic or not, to accomplish justice.
This
article presents the Panamanian Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad =
de
Panamá) established on January 18, 2001, by Executive Decree No. 2. This
Commission had the mandate to investigate human rights violations committed
during the military dictatorship of Generals Omar Torrijos Herrera and Manu=
el
Antonio Noriega between 1968 and 1989.
Key wo=
rds: Transitional justice, Truth Commissions, Human Rights,
Panama, United States.
United
Nations former Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted that it is only throu=
gh
"reintroducing the rule of law and confidence in its impartial applica=
tion
that we can hope to resuscitate societies shattered by conflict."[3] As
he declares, transitional justice is a critical element in the restructurat=
ion
of post-conflict states.
In the
past two decades, countries have been incorporating the transitional justice
mechanism to uncover and deal with crimes and human rights violations from =
the
past. Therefore, as a field of policy expertise, research, and law,
transitional justice is gaining relevance within the world's most significa=
nt
multilateral agencies, and it is being included in their work-agendas to bu=
ild
durable peace within countries.[4]
Truth
Commissions’ work often concludes with collecting a wide variety of records:
transcripts, video and audio recordings, e-mails and computer files, and
artifacts. According to Trudy H. Peterson, preservations “complete the
Commission’s work. Oppressive regimes try to impose selective amnesia on
society…Saving the records make sure that amnesia does not prevail.”[5]
As a
non-judicial body, a Truth Commission's purpose is different from the one
pursued in courtrooms. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon that, from the
information collected in these non-judicial bodies, the General Attorney de=
termines
to begin an investigation against a particular perpetrator.
The
mandate of Truth Commissions usually is to investigate and report the abuse=
s of
human rights committed over a specific period within a country or associated
with a particular conflict. The goals are providing guidance and
recommendations to prevent new abuses, like those committed in the past;
presenting recommendations calling upon reparations to the victims; pushing
reforms within the government and other social structures; and introducing
memorialization efforts and reconciliation plans.
For
Priscilla B. Hayner[6],
Truth Commissions should not be established by following some one size fits=
all
rules and guidelines. She argues that the Commissions' structure, functioni=
ng,
and objectives have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, considering the
country's particular context and political reality. Some actors proposed the
international approval of a basic template, so countries lacking the legal
expertise required establishing a commission could have a model to rely on.
However, this could risk the core principle of uniqueness required for Truth
Commissions and, therefore, its usefulness and legitimacy within the
population. The country has to decide how a commission should collect,
organize, and evaluate the testimonies from victims and other relevant acto=
rs
if the body should be taking public hearings instead of conducting their
mandate confidentially; or name-specific perpetrators. For that reason, the=
se
bodies are rarely smooth, pleasant, well-managed, well-funded, politically
uncomplicated bodies.[7]
Nonetheless,
there are essential and general characteristics related to commissions'
methodology and operation that countries have to address.
Establishment
There
are three conventional alternatives: presidential Decree, legislation in
Congress, and during a negotiated peace agreement.
The
benefit of a presidentially appointed commission is the possibility of a qu=
ick
establishment, avoiding political opposition or interference–at least in th=
eir
establishment–like the commissions of Panama, Argentina, and Chile.
Other
Commissions, like the ones established in El Salvador, and Guatemala, were
mandated by agreed on a national peace agreement administered by a United
Nations office.[8]
Others,
like the ones in Sierra Leone,[9]
Liberia,[10]
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,[11]
and Kenya,[12]
were created in a national peace agreement but later discussed and acknowle=
dged
by Congress, introducing specific terms regarding their functioning.
Commissioners
Some
commissions–like the one in Panama–have opted for limited consultation
concerning commissioners' selection. However, it is more desirable to imple=
ment
an elaborate selection process where the victims and the general population=
can
examine and recommend candidates. For example, the South African Commission=
was
the first to implement a method based on an independent selection panel and
public interview for finalists.[13]
This process was followed by the media, step-by-step, and ended up with a l=
ist
of twenty-five candidates forwarded to President Nelson Mandela for his fin=
al
selection of seventeen members.[14] Another
example is the Truth Commission of Ecuador, where commissioners were select=
ed
directly by non-governmental organizations.[15]
A
commission will have more legitimacy and public support if the society is
involved in the commissioners' selection process. Nonetheless, it is also
crucial to consider specific areas of expertise, geographic, gender, and
political representation when appointing members.
Term
The
Commission should have, as a general rule, a reasonable deadline–two or thr=
ee
years–to complete their mandate. Nevertheless, it is recommended to begin as
soon as possible after the political transition. For Hayner,[16] it
is strategic to keep a Truth Commission's tenure relatively short, preventi=
ng
the risk of losing momentum, focus, and political and public attention and
support. Two examples show the risk of extremely longs and shorts periods: =
The
Commission of Inquiry in Uganda (1986) had no deadline: they presented their
conclusions more than nine years after the commission started their activit=
y.
Unfortunately, their report had little public and political effect on the
population.[17]
On the opposite, the Commission of El Salvador only was appointed with a
six-month term, making it impossible to achieve their goal and resulting in
their request for a two-month extension.
Extent
of the investigation
Another
factor to consider is that the Commission should choose some representation
cases for in-depth investigation and summarize the rest. It is often more
useful for future actions and reconciliation to have a deeper understanding=
of
a few cases that a broad general knowledge of many of them.[18]
Date of
establishment
When
referring to the start date, there are advantages to start as soon as the
transition occurs: political momentum, popular support, and the accessibili=
ty
of evidence. Nevertheless, some countries prefer to give a reasonable time =
to
the new administration to settle and reinforce the new or restructured
democratic institution before working and dealing with the past.
Funding
Even
though it should be ideal for Commissions to be fully funded from the begin=
ning
of their mandate, "Insufficiently resourced" is often the main
complaint of Commissions.[19]
People used to think that the financial support of the government to
Commissions could diminish their impartiality. However, this is not true;
perhaps, the opposite. When commissions are fully funded, they have more
liberty to undertake their actions without asking for extra funding allocat=
ion.
However, with the increase of international organizations and multilateral
cooperation, now it is more common to see commissions partially funded by
foreign governments and international organizations.
Are Truth
Commissions popular?
Governments
are deciding, now with increasing frequency, to implement Truth Commission
because they usually find them beneficial and politically convenient. This =
is a
plausible way to address issues from the past without directly dealing with
them.[20]
Nevertheless,
governments are not the only ones who can benefit from the establishment of
Truth Commissions. For victims, these bodies represent a real opportunity to
achieve accountability, reparations, and overall, the system's improvement.=
Because
Truth Commissions are often mandated to identify, clarify, and formally
recognize past violations, victims' claims to "counter impunity" =
and
obtain individual accountability are perceived as tangible and imminent. Al=
so,
describing the institutional responsibility for the violence and the human
rights violations that occurred opens the door for structural
"non-repetition" reforms to the system while promoting reconcilia=
tion
and forgiveness within the parties involved.[21]
Fact-finding
is usually the first and most straightforward objective: to obtain “the tru=
th.”
This body aims to clarify ambiguous events, lifting the lid of secrecy and
denial to get an accurate record of a sensitive period of a country's histo=
ry.
The meetings with victims and relevant actors allow to reveal the hidden
history of the events, and the information recollected is often of a kind a=
nd
quality far better than what was available before, "in effect, the rep=
ort
of a Truth Commission reclaims a country's history and opens it for public
review."[22]
These facts were often quieted or unspoken, unusually reported honestly in =
the
press, and not taught in schools. These commissions also contribute to remo=
ving
the possibility of denial.
Another
benefit of Truth Commissions is that they focus primarily on victims. They
ordinarily allow victims, survivors, and witnesses to narrate their truth a=
nd
have a voice. The victims of dictatorships and conflicts have often been ke=
pt
in silence. Therefore, public hearings and reports describing a broad array=
of
suffering experiences can create awareness in the general population. The
victim-approach can also effectively help the victims and their families, as
the relatives of the forcibly disappeared can finally achieve clarity on th=
eir
beloved ones' legal status.
Moreover,
Truth Commissions can help ascertain the facts and gather evidence for futu=
re
counter impunity actions. Many Commissions transfer their records to the
prosecuting officials, where trials may result.
From a
different perspective, Truth Commissions open the possibility to evaluate
previous experiences and how to reform the State and the government to deter
further human rights abuses.
Finally,
these bodies may have the mandate to "encourage reconciliation";
however, not all Truth Commissions have this obligation, nor can they achie=
ve
it immediately. The national, political, or even personal reconciliation wi=
ll
depend, among other factors, on how the "full truth" is clarified=
and
what steps are taken after. In some cases, understanding the truth is only =
the
first step of healing a nation.
The Panamanian democratic era suddenly ended on October 11, 1968, af=
ter
a military coup d’etat toppled President Arnulfo Arias Madrid, only ten (10=
) days
after his administration started. The National Guard, led by Boris Martínez=
and
Jose Humberto Ramos, impeached President Arias, who managed to took refuge =
in
the Panama Canal Zone (at the time, under the control of the United States).
After that, the “Junta Provisional de Gobierno” [Provisional Junta of
Government] led by José María Pinilla Fábrega and Bolívar Urrutia Parrilla,=
was
imposed. Subsequently, Torrijos, one of the leaders, stopped all political
activity and shut down the congress. On February 23, 1969, Torrijos, sponso=
red
by the United States, removed Boris Martínez and José Humberto Ramos from t=
heir
positions and forced them into exile.
On July 31, 1981, Torrijos died in an airplane crash[23]
(there are several speculations whether this event was an accident or no.
However, no real evidence is presented to claim it was not an accident). Ma=
nuel
Antonio Noriega, who joined the Panamanian defense force in 1962, was the ch=
ief
of military intelligence at the time, hence, promptly after Torrijos died, =
he
consolidated his power and, in 1983, he became the leader of the Panamanian
armed forces and de facto leader of the country.[24]
Noriega's
primary role was to "monitor" political opponents and work closely
with the U.S. intelligence agencies to counter possible threats to the Pana=
ma
Canal. From the 1950s until shortly after the U.S. invasion in 1989, Noriega
worked with U.S. intelligence agencies. Precisely, he was a Central
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intelligence sources before 1989, informing abo=
ut
the illicit weapons market's status, military equipment, and money destined=
for
the U.S. supported forces through Latin America.
Though,
the honeymoon between Noriega and the U.S. did not last endlessly. The U.S.
Senate called him: "the best example in recent U.S. foreign policy of =
how
a foreign leader can manipulate the United States to the detriment of our
interest."[25]
For the U.S., Noriega formed “the hemisphere’s first narcokleptocracy.” [26]
Although it is questionable if Noriega manipulated the U.S. and not the
opposite, it has been proved that Noriega collaborated with Pablo Escobar, =
the
famous (or infamous) Colombian drug lord, to smuggle cocaine into the United
States and money laundering through Panama’s banking system. Furthermore,
tensions with the U.S. increase when Noriega dismissed Nicolas Ardito Barle=
tta,
Panamá "first democratically elected president in 16 years." The
quotation marks are because it has been known in Panama and within the U.S.
government[27]
that there was fraud in the elections against Arnulfo Arias Madrid.
As the
tensions within the two governments grow, Noriega continuously supported
non-democratic leaders, such as the Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Libya's
Muammar Gaddafi. Noriega, the first foreign head of state to be convicted i=
n a
U.S. court, was indicted in February 1988 on federal cocaine trafficking and
money laundering charges.
The
U.S. imposed general economic sanctions on Panama to boost the pressure.
Nevertheless, Noriega, which famous phrase was "Not a step back!"
refused to retreat.
In
December 1989, before the U.S. invasion, Panama's National Assembly proclai=
med
Noriega as the "Maximum Leader" and declared war on the United
States. Finally, Noriega mandates ended on December 20, 1989, when President
George W. Bush sent 27,000 troops to Panama in a military operation called
"Operation Just Cause" to tumble the dictatorship of Manuel Anton=
io
Noriega and to, in their words, restore Panama's path to democracy.
However,
the "Just Cause" was not "just" at all. It caused the d=
ead
of 23 U.S. nationals and several hundred, yet to be determined, Panamanian
civilians.[28] The
military operation was at midnight, a few days before Christmas, and the
military objectives were in the middle of a habitational area; there were no
warnings and hundreds of civilian casualties. This is, alongside the
dictatorship, a painful path in Panamanian history.
Noriega
surrendered days after the U.S. invasion, on January 3, 1990. He was hiding=
in
the papal nunciature. The tactic of the U.S. military and drug enforcement
administration agents was to blast high-volume rock music[29]
to get him to depart the protection of the Vatican.[30]
Noriega
was convicted and sentenced in Miami, Florida, to 40 years in prison. He se=
rved
17 years. Attorneys for Noriega argued that he was a war prisoner, so he mu=
st
be repatriated to Panama. Nevertheless, the petition was denied. However, he
was extradited to France in 2010, =
where
he had been convicted of money laundering to seven years in prison. In June
2011, the French foreign ministry announces that they had begun the extradi=
tion
of Noriega to Panama. In December of the same year, Noriega is effectively
extradited to Panama from France. Later, in June 2015, Noriega gives his fi=
rst
interview on a local channel, apologizing to Panama. Noriega died on May 29,
2017.[31]
It is
widely known in Panama that Torrijos and Noriega perpetuated numerous crimes
during the dictatorship. However, nobody can know, with precision, the
magnitude of those crimes. There is little information, covered with a veil=
of
secrecy, of all the victims or even the mass graves' location.
In
1999, several clandestine graves were discovered. It is essential to mention
that the first excavation was possible because of the disclosure of one
witness. The church aspired to find Hector Gallego, a Colombian catholic pr=
iest
who disappeared in June 1971. The body of Heliodoro Portugal was found inst=
ead,
along with five other remains. The excavations, therefore, started by the
initiative of the church and not of the government. Portugal was a
"leftist," and the last time he was seen alive was when being
forcibly pushed into a car on May 14, 1970.[32]
On
September 22, 1999, the former military barracks were inspected, and several
excavations were undertaken to find more graves. Days later, on September 2=
4,
three (3) sets of remains were discovered in that area. Despite this
significant result, the excavations were suspended. On December 10, 2000, t=
he
Catholic Church restarted the excavations with few dispersed finds.[33]
As we kn=
ow,
part of the world's history is not written in books and only survives in the
memory of the people who participated. Panama's experience concerning the
darkest hours of its history is not an exception. The chronicle of the
dictatorship and later U.S. invasion is deliberately vague. Furthermore, th=
ere
has not been in the past any intention to study this subject in any depth. =
For
that reason, this section includes an interview with a key actor in the pro=
cess
towards the creation of the Panamanian Truth Commission: Alfredo Castillero
Hoyos[34], former Ombudsman of Panama and, at the time, Head of the Foreign
Policy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is widely known as an
expert in human rights issues, political science and international affairs.=
Castille=
ro
Hoyos notices that the first draft of the Executive Decree that creates the
Panamanian Truth Commission was remarkably different from the Commission as=
we
know it. The proposal was to create a "Clarity Commission" to
undertake the investigations and prepare the final report in three (3) mont=
hs,
with no possibility of extension. During their mandate, the Commission would
not be allowed to access funds from international cooperation, and the final
report should be addressed, in a single-sealed copy, to the Attorney Genera=
l of
the Nation, who should decide the usefulness of the information and whether=
to
conduct or not any criminal investigations against the perpetrators. In
practice, this "Clarity Commission" would decrease any opportunit=
y to
make any major improvement, either=
for the victims or for society at large
In a sud=
den
political shift, a different proposal was presented[36], a
Truth Commission: this commission was able to access funds from internation=
al cooperation’s,
among other sources; was to work for 6 months and had the opportunity to ask
for a time extension if needed. Perhaps, more importantly, the final report
would be available for the public. The final report should be considered by=
the
Attorney General of the Nation, as included in the previous draft, but now =
the
right of victims to reparations was acknowledged.
Castille=
ro
Hoyos concludes by asserting that even though two-thirds of Panamanians vot=
ed
against the Dictatorship in 1989, and arguably an even more significant num=
ber
has come to reject the U.S. Invasion that took place the same year, clarify=
ing
the truth about the victims of the Dictatorship and those of the invasion h=
as
always been controversial in Panama. During a long time, for all practical
purposes, it was as if an unwritten pact had existed between the political
actors that participated in the Dictatorship and those that opposed it and
requested, applauded, or profited from the U.S. invasion, a quid pro quo=
whereby nothing would be done to achieve truth, justice, reparation, and
guarantees of non-recurrence in either case.[37]
Presid=
ent
Mireya Moscoso[38] cre=
ated
the Truth Commission through Executive Decree No. 2, January 18, 2001[39]
as a result of the discovery of the victims' bodies discovered in 1999. Thi=
s Commission
was created due to the moral demand to clarify the human rights violations
committed during the military regime.[40]
The Decree's declaration of motives also states that the truth's knowledge
makes it possible for the victims' relatives to honor them accordingly.
Theref=
ore,
the Commission's objective is to clarify the truth about the violation of t=
he
fundamental right to a life committed during the military regime. It is imp=
ortant
to note that the Commission's mandate was exclusively intended to investiga=
te
those types of human rights violations and not others like torture. This
exclusion of torture was regrettably; because torture was one of the most
widespread human rights violations committed during the military regime.[41]
Theref=
ore,
the Commission had the following duties: (i) Investigate the complete panor=
ama
of human rights violations concerning the violation of the right to life; (=
ii)
Gather information that allows the identification of victims; (iii) Recomme=
nd
legal and administrative measures to prevent the repetition of these atroci=
ous
events.
The Commiss=
ion
had seven commissioners: Juan Antonio Tejada Mora, Osvaldo Velasquez, Ferna=
ndo
Berguido, Otilia Tejeira de Koster, Julio Murray, Alberto Santiago Almanza,=
and
Rosa Maria de Briton. As soo=
n as
the Commission was announced, the opposition began. In January 2001, Balbina
Herrera, at the time president of the Revolutionary Democratic Party,
threatened to sue the Executive Decree that created the Commission at the
Supreme Court of Panama.[42]
However, no steps were taken.
The
Commission had the responsibility to collect valuable information from the
relatives of possible victims and human rights organizations. The Commission
had to accept statements, carry out proceedings, and prepare a final report
including all the findings while guaranteeing the sources' confidentiality =
to
secure the witnesses and informants' safety.
The fi=
nal
report had to be available for the public, published, and presented to the
Nation's Attorney General, who was responsible for adopting the appropriate
measures. The Commission's term was six (6) months, with the opportunity of
extension for three (3) additional months. Nonetheless, the Commission serv=
ed
for one (1) year and three (3) months.
Finall=
y,
the Executive Decree mandate all the public institutions collaborate with t=
he
Commission, making available the documents and facilitating access to the
appropriate.
The
Commission had the support of several North American and Panamanian
anthropologist. They created a Department of Anthropology within the
organization. This team conducted the excavations of over 30 sites. They al=
so
performed the recoveries and analysis of the remains found in several
territories of the country.[43]
Simila=
rly,
cultural anthropologist participated in the preliminary investigation. They
examined documents, interviewed informants, and developed a socio-cultural
profile of the victims' historical context.[44]
The fi=
rst
phase was the excavation. The team led by Loreto Suarez, a Chilean trained
archaeologist, identified, collected, and preserved the remains discovered.
During the excavation, the commission president Alberto Almanza complained =
that
U.S. anthropologist Sandy Anderson, who headed a forensic team, had been
threatened because of their work. Sandy Anderson and her Doberman-German
short-hair dog, Eagle, participated in hundreds of searches for missing peo=
ple,
including the ones related to 9/11, mass graves in Bosnia, and, as mentioned
before, in Panama. However, years later, in 2004, Sandy Anderson was convic=
ted
in U.S. District Court in Detroit[45]
for planting bones and other evidence at suspected crimes. Even though she =
did
not mention any reference to her work in Panama, this was used by the membe=
rs
of the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) to delegitimize and defame =
the
Commission.[46]
Notwit=
hstanding,
by April 18, 2002, the Commission had identified 110 victims. Most of the
violations of human rights occurred in the first year of the dictatorship
against supporters of Arnulfo Arias Madrid. However, these numbers were not
static, as the team gathered new information, such as the identification of
Jeronimo Díaz Lopez (confirmed in June 2003).[47]
Accord=
ing
to the Commission, 50% of the victims were murdered or disappeared between =
1986
and 1972; 20% between 1973 and 1983; 28% between 1984 and 1989. There is no
information known about the remaining 2%. [48]
Overal=
l,
the report concluded that the military regime was involved in "torture=
and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" of the victims. There is
available documentation of 110 out of 148 cases of reported human rights
abuses. The Commission also found
twenty-four (24) gravesites, and they excavated thirty-six (36) graves. The
graves sites were located principally at military sites throughout Panama,
Bocas del Toro, and the former Coiba prison.[49]
On Apr=
il
18, 2002, the term of operations of the Truth Commission expired. Still,
The
Commission made eleven recommendations, as follows:[51]
1.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The reactivation of cases that have new elements of
convictions due to the findings of the Commission.
2.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Financial and moral reparations to relatives of the vict=
ims.
3.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Creation of a permanent Special Prosecutor office with
jurisdiction over human rights violations and crimes against humanity.
4.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Strict civilian control over the national police and oth=
er
internal public security forces.
5.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Compliance with the international human rights framework=
and
guarantee the adequate protection of human rights. Particularly, accepting =
the
obligations of international law by compensating the families of victims.
6.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Human rights teaching must be reinforced at all levels of
education, especially those related to national security forces.
8.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The government should declare "the day of the
disappeared" as a form of recognition to the martyrs of Panamanian's
democracy.
9.<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
To maintain the systematic excavation where the skeletal
remains of the victims are presumed to exist.
10.=
To continue the analysis of DNA to identify the identity=
of
the bones identified.
VI. =
Noriega’s last interview
In
2015, Manuel Antonio Noriega, the former "powerful man" of Panama,
gave public statements on national television.
Explicitly,
he said:
" I ask for forgiveness to everyone
who may feel offended, affected, injured, or humiliated by my actions or th=
ose
of my superiors, or those of my subordinates while following orders under t=
he
responsibility of my civil and military government. As the last general of =
this
group, I end the military era's cycle asking for forgiveness. As the comman=
der
in chief and the head of government."[52]=
However,
his apologies were not useful nor seemed sincere. A sincere apology would
contribute to the reparation of victims. The fact that he did not disclose =
any
relevant information about the location of the disappeared victims nor the
assassinated ones gives a bittersweet taste.
Truth
Commissions are a helpful instrument for the reconstruction and reparation =
of
victims in the transition from a dictatorship or a conflict to democracy. T=
hese
commissions contribute to the investigation and presentation of evidence, so
the country can learn and move on from their traumatic experience. These bo=
dies
give a unique opportunity to achieve multi-dimensional accountability,
providing reparations to the victims, and improving the system.
Howeve=
r,
Truth Commissions are rarely smooth, pleasant, well-managed and funded, and
uncomplicated political bodies, because even though they are limited in act=
ion,
these bodies can evidence human rights violations often unspoken or ignored=
.
Panama=
is
not an exception. The Truth Commission had a critical mandate: clarify the
human rights violations and ubicate the remains of the victim of the
dictatorship. The task was difficult, mainly because it had strong oppositi=
on
from the political party founded by Omar Torrijos Herrera. Despite that, th=
ey
completed and presented a 700 pages final report with recommendations to
achieve complete reparations, not only for the victims but also for the cou=
ntry
and its democratic institutions.
The
problem is that all the efforts will be, continued or destroyed, depending =
on which
party is ruling the country. The more vivid example is that, at this time,
there is no way of accessing the final report of the Commission because it =
has
been, in our opinion, deliberately removed from all official sites.
Though
Noriega, in his last days, asked for forgiveness to "close the circle =
of a
military era in Panama," the lack of efforts to find the truth, compen=
sate
the victims, adopt measures to have strictly civilian control of the Nation=
al
police or even the publication of the Commission's report makes us doubt if=
the
"circle of a military era" will ever be closed.
y Licenciada en Derecho y Ciencias
Políticas (Universidad Santa María La Antigua, Cum Laude); Maestría en Derecho Internacional (New York
University). Miembro de la Fundación Libertad y Asesora Legal del Tribunal
Electoral de la República de Panamá.
[1]
TEITEL, Ruti (2003): “Transitional Justice
Genealogy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, V. 16, p. 70. Available at: https://www.qub.ac.uk/Research/GRI/m=
itchell-institute/FileStore/Filetoupload,757186,en.pdf. Accessed: 6 January 2021.[2] RUDLING,
Adriana (2011): “¿Algo más que verdad? Un estudio sobre la implementación de
las recomendaciones de la Comisión de la Verdad de Panamá”, p. 74. <=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-family:"Garamond",serif;mso-bidi-font-family:"Ti=
mes New Roman";
background:white'>Available at: . Accessed: 7 January 2021].[3]
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY: “Secretary-General's Address to the Gener=
al
Assembly”, New York, September 21, 2004, available at: .
[4] For instance, the Unit=
ed
Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Inter-Americ=
an
Commission on Human Rights.
[5]
PETERSON, Trudy (2005): <=
i>Final
Acts: A Guide To Preserving The Records Of Truth Commissions (Washingto=
n,
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, First Edition), p. 2.
[6]
HAYNER, Priscilla (2011): =
;Unspeakable
Truths Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New
York, Routledge, Second Edition), p. 12.
[7]
HAYNER (2011), p. 210.
[8]
UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL: “
[10] Id., p. 66.
[11] Id., p. 253.
[12] Id., p. 73.
[13]<=
/a>
SOUTH AFRICA, Act 95-34 (26/07/1995),
Promotion Of National Unity And Reconciliation Act.
[17]<=
/a>
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEA=
CE: “Truth Commission: Uganda 86”.
Available at: . Accessed: 7 January 2021.
[23]
El Pais, (8/1/1981). Available=
at:
https://elpais.com/diario/1981/08/02/internacional/365551203_850215.html.
Accessed: 7 January 2021.
[31]To see more details: CNN Library (2017). Manuel Noriega Fast Facts. Available at: =
https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/19/world/americas/manuel-=
noriega-fast-facts/index.html. Accessed: 7 January 2021.=
[36] Id. (The
proposal, which adhered to then current international best practices regard=
ing
truth commissions, was prepared by Castillero Hoyos with Irene Ábrego Coron=
ado
and was presented with the authorization of then Minister of For=
eign
Affairs, José Miguel Alemán and Presidential Advisor, Mario Galindo).
[41]GONZALEZ PINILLA, José (2017):
“Asesinados y desaparecidos, la eterna búsqueda de la verdad” at La Prensa (8/30/2017). Available at:
https://www.prensa.com/judiciales/Asesinados-desaparecidos-eterna-busqueda-=
verdad_0_4837016284.html.
Accessed: 7 January 2021; GUEVARA MANN, Carlos (2018): “Panamá En 1968” Palabras Del Dr. Carlos
Guevara Mann en el evento académico “Reflexiones Históricas a los 50 años d=
el
11 de octubre de 1968”, Rev=
ista
Investigación y Pensamiento Crítico, V. 6, Nº 3, pp. 58-67. Available at: http://ipc.org.pa/ojs/index.php/ipc/article/view/95/93<=
/span>. Accessed:=
7
January 2021.
[42]<=
/a>
Panamá América (1/21/2001).&nb=
sp; Available
at: https://www.panamaamerica.com.pa/nac=
ion/prd-demandara-el-decreto-sobre-comision-de-la-verdad-6152. Accessed: 7 January 2021.
[45]<=
/a>
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE U=
NITED
STATES (2004): “SANDRA MARIE ANDERSON SENTENCED FOR FALSIFYING MATE=
RIAL
FACTS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, AND FALSE REPRESENTATIONS”. Available at=
: . Accessed: 12 January 2021.
[46]<=
/a> LINARES FRANCO, Adolfo (2004): “El PRD, el perro 'Eagle' y la Comisión =
de
la Verdad” La Prensa (3/28/2004). Available at: https://www.prensa.com/impresa/opini=
on/PRD-perro-Eagle-Comision-Verdad_0_1160884047.html. Accessed: 7 January 2021.
IUSTITIA et PULCHRITUDO (ISSN
1607-4319)
Vol. 2, No. 1, Enero - Junio 2021
pp. 19 - 30
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